Table of Contents
Renowned Russian studies expert Stephen Cohen explains how NATO expansion, oligarch privatization, and Putin demonization transformed post-Cold War partnership into nuclear brinkmanship.
Key Takeaways
- NATO expansion eastward violated promises made to Gorbachev and created the foundation for current Russia-US tensions, as predicted by diplomat George Kennan in 1998.
- The 1990s Russian economic collapse killed more people than many wars, with male life expectancy dropping to 57 years during the "democratic" transition period.
- Putin's cooperation after 9/11, including intelligence sharing and military assistance in Afghanistan, was ignored in favor of continued adversarial policies toward Russia.
- Current nuclear risks exceed Cold War levels because military buildups now occur directly on Russian borders rather than through proxy conflicts in distant regions.
- American triumphalism after Soviet collapse created unrealistic expectations that Russia should remain permanently subservient to US interests like defeated World War II enemies.
- The demonization of Putin serves to justify NATO expansion and military buildup while preventing diplomatic solutions to international crises requiring US-Russia cooperation.
- Young scholars now self-censor research on Russia due to career risks, potentially creating a "lost generation" of expertise similar to McCarthyism effects.
- Russia-China strategic partnership represents the most significant geopolitical realignment of the 21st century, driven primarily by US policies that pushed Moscow toward Beijing.
Timeline Overview
- 00:00–18:30 — Stephen Cohen's Background and Soviet Experience: Professor Cohen's credentials, his time living in Soviet Russia 1976-1982, discovering the real "na leva" (under-the-table) society through bartering systems including abortions for Elton John tickets
- 18:30–35:45 — Jim Crow South and Repressive Societies: Cohen's childhood in segregated Kentucky, parallels between American apartheid and Soviet repression, how repressive societies change, and the trauma of Soviet collapse exceeding America's Great Depression
- 35:45–52:20 — Media Transformation and Russia Expertise: Changes from serious CBS network analysis to current social media punditry, the disappearance of genuine Russia experts from mainstream media, and new litmus tests replacing Cold War-era caution
- 52:20–68:15 — NATO Expansion and Broken Promises: George Kennan's prescient 1998 warnings, Gorbachev's assurances about eastward expansion, American triumphalism after Cold War "victory," and the myth of Russian partnership under Yeltsin
- 68:15–85:30 — Putin Demonization and Nuclear Risks: Why Putin became the enemy despite post-9/11 cooperation, new Cold War dangers with military confrontations on Russian borders, deconfliction talks between generals, and hypersonic weapons development
- 85:30–102:45 — Historical Context and Russian Grievances: Russia's traumatic 20th century history from revolution through World War II to collapse, fundamental differences in historical experience, and why Russians can't "jump out of their history"
- 102:45–118:00 — Current Crisis Analysis and Solutions: Why America needs enemies, the role of corporate interests, Putin as European leader, missed opportunities for cooperation, and the Russia-China alliance implications for global geopolitics
From Partnership to Paranoia: The Unraveling of Post-Cold War Hopes
The transformation of US-Russia relations from post-Cold War optimism to nuclear brinkmanship represents one of the most consequential foreign policy failures in modern American history. Stephen Cohen, professor emeritus at Princeton and NYU who spent decades studying Soviet and Russian affairs, traces this deterioration to fundamental misunderstandings about how the Cold War ended and what Russia's place should be in the post-Soviet world order.
The critical error began with American triumphalism following the Soviet Union's collapse. Rather than recognizing that the Cold War had been negotiated to an end through diplomatic agreements between Reagan, Gorbachev, and Bush, American political leaders chose to frame the outcome as a decisive victory comparable to defeating Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. This interpretation created expectations that Russia, like post-war Germany and Japan, should remain permanently subordinate to American interests and accept whatever policies Washington deemed appropriate.
George Kennan, the architect of Cold War containment strategy, recognized the dangers of this approach immediately. His prescient 1998 interview with Thomas Friedman warned that NATO expansion would inevitably provoke Russian backlash, creating exactly the adversarial relationship that expansion was supposedly designed to prevent. Kennan described the Senate debate over NATO expansion as "superficial and ill-informed," noting that the policy showed "so little understanding of Russian history" and would ultimately strengthen Russian hardliners while weakening those who had ended the Cold War peacefully.
The promises made to Mikhail Gorbachev regarding NATO's future boundaries have become central to understanding Russian grievances. Declassified transcripts now confirm that Secretary of State James Baker explicitly assured Gorbachev that NATO would not move "one inch to the east" if Germany were allowed to reunify within the alliance. These assurances were crucial to Soviet acceptance of German reunification, yet they were systematically violated as NATO expanded to include former Warsaw Pact members and eventually former Soviet republics.
The human cost of post-Soviet transition provides essential context for understanding Russian perspectives on the 1990s. While Western observers celebrated Russia's "democratic transition," the economic collapse was more severe than America's Great Depression by most statistical measures. Male life expectancy fell to 57 years as social services collapsed, organized crime flourished, and oligarchs stripped state assets through rigged privatization schemes. This catastrophic decline explains why many Russians view the 1990s not as liberation but as national humiliation enabled by Western policies.
Boris Yeltsin's cooperation with American interests during this period came at enormous cost to Russian sovereignty and dignity. Cohen reveals that Clinton administration officials privately acknowledged they were "shoveling shit in old Boris's face" while publicly celebrating the US-Russia partnership. This cynical approach created unsustainable expectations that future Russian leaders would continue accepting subordinate status regardless of their country's legitimate security interests.
The missed opportunities for genuine partnership become apparent when examining Putin's initial outreach to the West. His immediate post-9/11 call to President Bush offering comprehensive assistance in Afghanistan demonstrated Russia's potential value as a strategic partner. Russian intelligence networks, Northern Alliance connections, and military expertise in Central Asia proved invaluable to American operations. Yet this cooperation was treated as expected tribute rather than generous assistance deserving reciprocal consideration of Russian concerns.
The Demonization Campaign: Manufacturing a Nuclear Enemy
The systematic demonization of Vladimir Putin in American media and political discourse serves multiple functions that extend far beyond legitimate criticism of authoritarian governance. Cohen argues that "Putin-izing" Russia - making Putin's personality the central explanation for all bilateral tensions - obscures the structural factors driving conflict while preventing rational discussion of diplomatic solutions.
This personalization strategy follows familiar patterns in American foreign policy, where complex geopolitical relationships are reduced to individual villain narratives. However, the Putin demonization campaign differs qualitatively from previous examples because it targets the leader of a nuclear superpower with whom the United States must maintain functional diplomatic channels to prevent catastrophic war.
The transformation of mainstream media coverage represents a particularly troubling development. During the original Cold War, networks maintained serious foreign correspondents and regional experts who understood the stakes involved in US-Soviet relations. Today's coverage relies heavily on commentators with minimal expertise who focus on generating attention rather than informing public understanding of nuclear risks.
Cohen's personal experience illustrates the broader chilling effect on Russian studies. Despite his established reputation and decades of scholarship, he has been marginalized from mainstream media since 2014 for presenting alternative interpretations of the Ukraine crisis. Young scholars now report choosing "safer" dissertation topics rather than pursuing research that might challenge prevailing narratives, creating the potential for a "lost generation" of expertise similar to the McCarthyism period.
The litmus test phenomenon extends beyond academia into political discourse. Presidential candidates are expected to demonstrate their credibility through ritualistic Putin denunciations, regardless of whether such rhetoric serves American interests. This dynamic prevents serious discussion of nuclear risks and diplomatic alternatives, creating a political environment where cooperation with Russia becomes impossible regardless of strategic necessity.
The irrationality of current demonization becomes apparent when compared to previous American cooperation with Soviet leaders who were explicitly communist and ideologically opposed to the United States. Roosevelt negotiated extensively with Stalin, Reagan engaged deeply with Gorbachev, and Kennedy managed the Cuban Missile Crisis through direct communication with Khrushchev. Yet Putin, who explicitly rejects communist ideology and has expressed willingness to cooperate with the West, is treated as uniquely dangerous and untrustworthy.
Media coverage increasingly relies on speculation and innuendo rather than verified facts. Claims about Russian interference, assassination plots, and geopolitical manipulation are often presented without sufficient evidence while alternative explanations are dismissed as "Russian apologism." This pattern creates an information environment where escalation appears rational while diplomatic engagement seems naive or treasonous.
The consequences extend beyond bilateral relations to affect global governance. International crises requiring US-Russia cooperation - from nuclear proliferation to terrorism to climate change - become impossible to address effectively when Russia is characterized as an implacable enemy rather than a potential partner with legitimate interests that must be accommodated through negotiation.
Nuclear Brinkmanship: Why This Cold War Is More Dangerous
The current confrontation with Russia poses significantly greater risks of nuclear war than the original Cold War, despite receiving far less public attention or political discussion. Cohen identifies multiple factors that make today's tensions more volatile and potentially catastrophic than the US-Soviet rivalry that dominated global politics for four decades.
Geographic proximity represents the most fundamental difference. The original Cold War maintained buffer zones between American and Soviet forces, with direct confrontations occurring primarily through proxy conflicts in distant regions like Vietnam, Angola, or Afghanistan. Today's military buildups place NATO forces directly on Russian borders, creating multiple potential flashpoints where miscalculation could rapidly escalate to nuclear conflict.
The institutionalization of "deconfliction" talks between Russian and American generals reveals the military leadership's awareness of these risks. These secret communications channels allow commanders to coordinate movements and avoid accidental engagements in Syria, Ukraine, and other regions where both powers operate military forces. The very existence of such procedures demonstrates that professional military officers understand the dangers that political leaders and media commentators seem to ignore or dismiss.
Nuclear weapons technology has evolved in ways that complicate traditional deterrence calculations. Russia's development of hypersonic missiles represents a response to American deployment of ballistic missile defense systems that Moscow interprets as preparation for a first strike capability. The breakdown of arms control treaties - including American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and more recently the INF Treaty - has removed important constraints on nuclear competition.
The proliferation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons recreates some of the most dangerous dynamics of the 1980s. These weapons, with flight times measured in minutes rather than hours, compress decision-making timeframes and increase the risk of launch-on-warning scenarios where nuclear war could begin through technical malfunction or misinterpretation of defensive measures as offensive preparations.
Perhaps most dangerously, public awareness of nuclear risks has declined dramatically since the Cold War's end. The original US-Soviet confrontation occurred in a cultural context where nuclear war was widely discussed and feared, creating political pressure for arms control agreements and crisis management procedures. Today's nuclear dangers receive minimal media attention, allowing tensions to escalate without corresponding public demand for diplomatic solutions.
The absence of experienced diplomatic personnel compounds these risks. Many of the officials who managed previous nuclear crises have retired or died, while their successors often lack comparable experience with nuclear diplomacy. The institutional knowledge developed through decades of arms control negotiations and crisis management has atrophied just as new nuclear risks emerge.
Military doctrine has also evolved in concerning directions. Both American and Russian strategic thinking increasingly incorporates "limited" nuclear weapons use scenarios, abandoning the previous assumption that any nuclear exchange would inevitably escalate to full-scale war. This doctrinal shift makes nuclear weapons seem more "usable" to military planners, potentially lowering the threshold for their employment in regional conflicts.
The economic dimensions of nuclear competition create additional instabilities. Both countries face pressure to modernize aging nuclear arsenals while managing other military priorities and fiscal constraints. This modernization process introduces new technologies and capabilities that may be misinterpreted as preparation for aggressive action, triggering defensive responses that further destabilize the nuclear balance.
Historical Trauma and Civilizational Differences
Understanding contemporary Russian behavior requires recognizing the profound historical experiences that shaped Russian national consciousness throughout the twentieth century. Cohen emphasizes that Russians "can't jump out of their history any more than you and I can jump out of our skin," highlighting fundamental differences between Russian and American historical experience that continue to influence bilateral relations.
The scope of Russian suffering during the past century exceeds most Americans' capacity for comprehension. Beginning with World War I casualties and revolutionary upheaval, continuing through civil war brutality and Stalinist collectivization famines, culminating in World War II losses exceeding 27 million Soviet citizens, Russian historical memory is dominated by catastrophic violence and social transformation.
World War II holds particular significance in Russian consciousness as the "Great Patriotic War" that validated Soviet sacrifice and demonstrated Russian resilience against existential threats. Unlike Americans, who experienced the war as distant overseas conflict, Russians lived through Nazi occupation, siege warfare, and systematic extermination campaigns. This experience created deep skepticism about Western intentions and lasting sensitivity to perceived security threats along Russian borders.
The post-Stalin period brought additional psychological trauma through the systematic debunking of political myths that had sustained two generations. The revelation that Stalin - taught in schools as history's greatest and kindest ruler - was actually responsible for mass murder created profound disillusionment with ideological certainties and political authority. This experience explains persistent Russian cynicism about political promises and foreign assurances.
Gorbachev's reforms and the Soviet Union's collapse represented another traumatic transformation that most Americans celebrated but Russians experienced as national catastrophe. The economic depression that followed exceeded America's Great Depression in severity, while social institutions collapsed and life expectancy plummeted. Understanding this context is essential for comprehending why many Russians view Putin's restoration of state authority as necessary stability rather than authoritarian regression.
Cultural and spiritual dimensions of Russian identity also differ significantly from American individualism. Russian Orthodox Christianity, with its emphasis on communal salvation and spiritual struggle, contrasts sharply with Protestant traditions that emphasize personal success and material progress. These religious differences influence political expectations about state authority, social responsibility, and national purpose.
The geographic reality of Russia as a Eurasian civilization straddling Europe and Asia creates additional complexities that Americans struggle to understand. Russian intellectuals have debated for centuries whether their country belongs to European civilization or represents a unique "third way" between East and West. This debate remains relevant as Russia navigates relationships with both European neighbors and Asian partners like China.
Language barriers compound these cultural differences. Putin's fluency in German and improving English reflect his European orientation, but most American officials cannot communicate directly with Russian counterparts. This linguistic gap necessitates interpretation that may miss crucial nuances while creating opportunities for misunderstanding that can escalate into political conflicts.
The Russian concept of "derzhava" - great power status based on military strength, territorial expanse, and international influence - conflicts with American expectations that Russia should accept regional power status subordinate to American global leadership. This status competition reflects deeper questions about national dignity and historical significance that cannot be resolved through economic incentives alone.
Soviet-era experiences with Western duplicity also inform contemporary Russian skepticism about American promises. The history of broken arms control agreements, economic assistance that came with humiliating conditions, and political interference disguised as democracy promotion created lasting suspicion about Western motives that influences Russian responses to current diplomatic initiatives.
The Geopolitical Realignment: Russia Pivots to China
The most significant consequence of failed US-Russia relations may be the emerging Moscow-Beijing strategic partnership that is reshaping global geopolitics in ways that could prove permanently detrimental to American interests. Cohen identifies this alliance as "the most important bilateral relationship emerging in the world today," representing a fundamental realignment driven primarily by American policies that forced Russia to seek alternative partnerships.
The historical trajectory of Sino-Russian relations provides context for understanding the significance of current cooperation. These two continental powers have alternated between alliance and rivalry for centuries, with the 1960s Sino-Soviet split representing one of the most consequential breaks in communist world solidarity. The gradual rapprochement that began in the 1980s has accelerated dramatically since 2014, when Western sanctions following the Ukraine crisis pushed Russia toward deeper economic and military cooperation with China.
Economic complementarity makes this partnership particularly durable. Russia's vast energy resources and mineral wealth align perfectly with China's insatiable demand for commodities, while Chinese manufacturing capacity and financial resources help Russia circumvent Western sanctions. The Belt and Road Initiative provides a framework for integrating Russian transportation networks with Chinese trade routes, creating economic interdependencies that strengthen political cooperation.
Military collaboration between Russia and China has reached levels unseen since the 1950s. Joint military exercises, weapons sales, and technology sharing demonstrate growing trust between defense establishments that were previously suspicious of each other's intentions. Russian advanced weapons systems, including S-400 air defense missiles and Su-35 fighter aircraft, enhance Chinese military capabilities while providing Russia with crucial export revenues.
The technological dimension of Russia-China cooperation poses particular challenges for American competitiveness. Russian expertise in nuclear technology, space systems, and advanced materials complements Chinese manufacturing capacity and artificial intelligence development. This combination could produce technological innovations that challenge American dominance in high-tech industries crucial for future economic growth and military superiority.
Arctic cooperation represents another area where Russia-China partnership could disadvantage American interests. Climate change has opened new shipping routes and resource extraction opportunities in the Arctic Ocean, where Russia holds the largest territorial claims. Chinese investment in Russian Arctic projects provides financing for infrastructure development while giving Beijing access to energy resources and shipping lanes that could reduce dependence on sea routes controlled by the American navy.
Financial integration between Russia and China has accelerated following Western sanctions that restricted Russian access to dollar-denominated financial systems. The development of alternative payment systems, increased trade in national currencies, and Chinese participation in Russian energy projects reduces both countries' vulnerability to American financial pressure while potentially undermining the dollar's role as the global reserve currency.
The diplomatic implications of Russia-China cooperation extend far beyond bilateral relations. Joint positions on issues ranging from Syrian conflict resolution to North Korean nuclear programs to Venezuelan political crisis demonstrate coordination that often opposes American preferences. This alignment provides both countries with greater leverage in international negotiations while complicating American diplomatic initiatives that require broad international support.
Central Asian dynamics illustrate how Russia-China cooperation could reshape regional power balances. China's Belt and Road investments in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other former Soviet republics overlap with Russia's traditional sphere of influence, but the two powers appear to be coordinating their approaches rather than competing. This cooperation could gradually reduce American influence in a region that has been strategically important for energy transportation and counterterrorism operations.
Missed Opportunities and Alternative Futures
The tragedy of contemporary US-Russia relations lies not in inevitable conflict between incompatible systems, but in the systematic rejection of opportunities for cooperation that could have served both countries' interests while enhancing global stability. Cohen's analysis reveals multiple moments when different policy choices might have produced fundamentally different outcomes, suggesting that current tensions result from policy failures rather than immutable geopolitical forces.
The immediate post-Cold War period offered the greatest potential for establishing cooperative relations based on shared interests rather than ideological competition. Russia's explicit rejection of communist ideology and embrace of market economics removed the primary sources of previous conflict, while both countries faced common challenges from international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and regional instability.
A genuine Marshall Plan for post-Soviet Russia could have addressed the economic catastrophe that claimed millions of lives during the 1990s while creating political constituencies for continued cooperation. Instead of predatory privatization schemes that enriched oligarchs while impoverishing ordinary citizens, massive Western investment in infrastructure, education, and economic development might have created sustainable prosperity that would have made authoritarianism unnecessary and unappealing.
The September 11 attacks created another opportunity for strategic cooperation based on shared counterterrorism interests. Putin's immediate offer of comprehensive assistance demonstrated Russia's potential value as a partner in addressing common security threats. Rather than treating this cooperation as expected tribute, reciprocal American consideration of Russian security concerns might have established patterns of mutual accommodation that could have prevented subsequent conflicts.
European integration represented perhaps the most promising avenue for long-term cooperation. Putin's vision of Russia as a European country suggested possibilities for gradually incorporating Russia into Western institutional frameworks rather than treating it as a permanent outsider. Economic integration through energy partnerships, political cooperation through arms control agreements, and cultural exchanges through educational programs could have created webs of interdependence that made conflict increasingly costly and irrational.
The alternative trajectory that these missed opportunities might have produced becomes apparent when considering current global challenges that require US-Russia cooperation. Climate change, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, and pandemic disease control all transcend national boundaries and ideological differences, requiring sustained collaboration between major powers to achieve effective solutions.
Nuclear arms control represents the most immediate area where US-Russia cooperation remains essential regardless of political tensions. Both countries possess nuclear arsenals capable of destroying human civilization, making their relationship fundamentally different from other international rivalries. The breakdown of arms control treaties and the development of new weapons systems increases risks that can only be managed through direct negotiations and mutual agreements.
Energy cooperation could serve both countries' economic interests while enhancing global energy security. Russian energy resources, American extraction technologies, and shared interests in stable energy markets provide foundations for cooperation that could reduce geopolitical tensions while addressing climate change through cleaner extraction and transportation methods.
Space exploration represents another area where competition could be transformed into cooperation. Both countries possess complementary capabilities in space technology, with Russian expertise in launch systems and life support combining effectively with American innovations in satellite technology and planetary exploration. Joint missions could achieve scientific objectives impossible for either country alone while demonstrating peaceful cooperation.
The current trajectory toward renewed Cold War confrontation serves neither country's fundamental interests while imposing enormous costs on both societies. Military expenditures required for nuclear competition divert resources from domestic priorities, while political tensions prevent cooperation on shared challenges that threaten both countries' long-term security and prosperity.
Conclusion
Stephen Cohen's analysis reveals how American triumphalism after the Cold War's end transformed a negotiated peace into renewed confrontation through NATO expansion, broken promises, and systematic demonization of Russian leadership. The resulting nuclear crisis poses greater risks than the original Cold War because military confrontations now occur directly on Russian borders rather than through distant proxies. With Russia-China strategic partnership emerging as the most significant geopolitical realignment of the 21st century, American foreign policy faces a fundamental choice between continued confrontation and diplomatic engagement to address shared global challenges requiring great power cooperation.
Practical Questions & Answers
Q: How did NATO expansion specifically violate promises made to Russia?
A: Declassified transcripts confirm Secretary of State James Baker explicitly told Gorbachev that NATO would not move "one inch to the east" if Germany were allowed to reunify within the alliance. These assurances were crucial to Soviet acceptance of German reunification but were systematically violated as NATO expanded to include former Warsaw Pact members and Soviet republics.
Q: Why does Cohen argue the current nuclear crisis is more dangerous than the original Cold War?
A: Unlike the original Cold War where confrontations occurred through distant proxies, today's military buildups place NATO forces directly on Russian borders. This geographic proximity creates multiple potential flashpoints where miscalculation could rapidly escalate, requiring "deconfliction" talks between generals to prevent accidental war.
Q: What opportunities for US-Russia cooperation were missed after the Cold War ended?
A: Major missed opportunities include: rejecting a genuine Marshall Plan for post-Soviet economic recovery, treating Putin's post-9/11 cooperation as expected tribute rather than generous assistance, and failing to integrate Russia into European institutional frameworks despite Putin's expressed European orientation.
Q: How has the Russia-China partnership changed global geopolitics? A: This alliance combines Russia's energy resources and military technology with China's manufacturing capacity and financial resources, creating economic interdependencies while providing alternatives to Western-dominated financial systems. Joint positions on international issues increasingly oppose American preferences, complicating US diplomatic initiatives.
Q: What role did American triumphalism play in current tensions?
A: Framing the Cold War's end as American victory rather than negotiated peace created expectations that Russia should remain permanently subordinate like defeated World War II enemies. This interpretation justified policies treating Russia as a regional power that should accept whatever Washington deemed appropriate.
Q: Why has expertise on Russia declined in American media and academia?
A: New litmus tests require ritualistic Putin denunciations for credibility, while young scholars choose "safer" dissertation topics to avoid career risks. Genuine Russia experts have been marginalized from mainstream media since 2014, replaced by commentators with minimal expertise focused on generating attention rather than informing understanding.
