Boom Supersonic's Audacious Plan: Building America's First Commercial Supersonic Jet Since the 1970s Ban

Blake Scholl reveals how Boom Supersonic plans to succeed where Concorde failed, why they're building their own engines for 6x less cost than legacy players, and the mysterious side project that could reduce capital requirements by an order of magnitude.

Key Takeaways

• Boom Supersonic has raised over $600 million and built the first civil supersonic jet made in America for under $200 million—6x more capital efficient than NASA's equivalent project
• The 1973 supersonic overland flight ban killed natural technology progression from private jets to airliners, forcing expensive prestige projects instead of market-driven development
• Concorde's failure stemmed from central planning rather than technological limitations—100 uncomfortable seats at $20,000 inflation-adjusted fares couldn't sustain commercial operations
• Modern technology enables 75% fare reduction to around $5,000 business class pricing through composite materials, efficient engines, and computational design improvements
• Vertical integration provides massive advantages: $2 million 3D printer produces engine turbine blades versus $1 million cost and 6-month delays through traditional aerospace supply chains
• Congressional politics forces geographically dispersed supply chains across multiple states, creating inefficient shipping networks where parts spend more time on trucks than in production
• United Airlines and American Airlines have placed pre-orders with prepayment schedules, targeting 64-seat aircraft for trans-oceanic routes by end of 2029
• The regulatory approval process works through early collaboration with FAA rather than Boeing's failed delegation model that lost regulator trust
• A secret revenue diversification project—described as Boom's equivalent of SpaceX's Starlink—could reduce capital requirements by an order of magnitude

Timeline Overview

• 00:00–15:00 — Supersonic aviation history: Why Concorde failed, the 1973 overland ban impact, comparing central planning versus market-driven development approaches
• 15:00–30:00 — Business model framework: 64-seat premium aircraft, $5,000 fare targets, airline partnerships with United and American, trans-oceanic route focus
• 30:00–45:00 — Capital efficiency strategies: $600 million raised, SpaceX-inspired vertical integration, small elite team advantages, hardware versus software funding myths
• 45:00–60:00 — Manufacturing innovation: Symphony engine development, 3D printing turbine blades, congressional supply chain inefficiencies, political versus economic optimization
• 60:00–75:00 — Regulatory navigation: FAA collaboration approach, building trust through transparency, avoiding Boeing's delegation model failures
• 75:00–90:00 — Technology advancement: Composite materials, computational design, turbofan engines, 20% efficiency improvements versus 1970s baseline

Why Concorde Failed: Central Planning Versus Market Evolution

Blake Scholl's analysis reveals how Cold War politics created economically doomed supersonic projects that killed natural technology progression through market-driven iteration cycles.

• The 1969 moon landing and Concorde first flight represented centrally planned prestige projects that ignored market viability in favor of national competition with Soviet Russia
• Concorde carried only 100 passengers in 17-inch wide economy-style seats at $20,000 inflation-adjusted fares, making commercial success mathematically impossible
• The aircraft required passengers to duck when boarding due to narrow fuselage design, delivering an uncomfortable experience despite premium pricing
• 1970s and 1980s air travel volumes couldn't support luxury-only aircraft with such limited capacity and extreme pricing, unlike today's business travel market
• The natural technology evolution should have started with 5-10 passenger private jets for wealthy individuals and companies on domestic routes like Seattle to Miami
• Small supersonic jets could have achieved quiet operation more easily while providing iteration opportunities to develop larger, more efficient aircraft over time
• The 1973 US supersonic overland flight ban eliminated the logical starting market, forcing development toward expensive trans-oceanic prestige projects instead
• This regulatory intervention froze technological progress by making the most accessible market segment illegal, preventing normal innovation cycles from occurring

The central planning approach created products optimized for political rather than economic success, dooming supersonic aviation before market forces could guide development.

The Market-Driven Model: Business Class Economics at Scale

Boom's strategy focuses on capturing existing business travel demand rather than creating new luxury markets, using modern airline economics to achieve commercial viability.

• Business class represents approximately 80% of international airline profits despite limited seat count, providing economically significant target market for supersonic service
• The 64-seat aircraft configuration matches typical business class capacity on existing international routes, ensuring airlines can fill available seats
• Target pricing around $5,000 per business class ticket represents 75% reduction from Concorde's inflation-adjusted fares while maintaining airline profitability
• Break-even economics require only 80% load factors on routes like New York to London, with round-trip fares around $3,500 compared to current $5,000+ business class pricing
• Integration with existing airline networks enables frequent flyer benefits, status recognition, and connection opportunities that standalone supersonic airlines couldn't provide
• United Airlines, American Airlines, and Japan Airlines pre-orders with prepayment schedules validate market demand and provide development funding
• The speed dividend enables aircraft to complete twice as many daily trips compared to subsonic alternatives, improving asset utilization and reducing per-passenger costs
• Airlines gain competitive advantages through passenger preference surveys showing 87% of business travelers would switch carriers for supersonic access

This market-focused approach addresses actual customer needs rather than creating artificial luxury segments that proved unsustainable historically.

Vertical Integration Advantage: The $2 Million Solution

Boom's manufacturing philosophy demonstrates how vertical integration can dramatically reduce costs and accelerate development cycles compared to traditional aerospace supply chains.

• Engine turbine blade production through traditional aerospace suppliers required $1 million cost and 6-month delivery times for prototype quantities
• Individual blade manufacturing actually takes only 24 hours, but supply chain complexity extends delivery to 180 days through unnecessary geographic distribution
• A $2 million 3D printing machine purchase enabled in-house production within weeks, providing blade manufacturing capability for the cost of two engines' worth of outsourced parts
• Traditional supply chains spread single-part production across multiple states: raw materials in South Carolina, processing in North Carolina, then Wisconsin, back to South Carolina, and multiple California stops
• Congressional politics drives geographically dispersed supply chains to distribute defense spending across districts, creating politically optimized rather than economically efficient production networks
• Cost-plus defense contracting incentivizes expense maximization rather than efficiency, as contractors benefit from higher costs through percentage-based profit margins
• SpaceX demonstrated similar vertical integration benefits by bringing raw materials in one side of the Hawthorne factory and producing complete rockets and engines from the other side
• The Symphony engine development uses approximately 60% in-house manufacturing with plans to increase self-sufficiency as production scales

This approach enables both cost reduction and schedule acceleration while maintaining quality control throughout the manufacturing process.

Regulatory Strategy: Collaboration Over Confrontation

Boom's relationship with the FAA demonstrates how early engagement and transparency can prevent the regulatory delays that plague traditional aerospace manufacturers.

• Traditional Boeing delegation model allows companies to self-certify through internal FAA-equivalent employees, presenting completed projects for rubber-stamp approval
• This approach creates adversarial relationships when regulators discover problems late in development cycles, forcing expensive redesigns and schedule delays
• Boom's XB-1 prototype approval took 90 minutes rather than the typical 90-day process because FAA officials observed development from initial design through first flight
• Early collaboration enables regulator input during design phases when changes remain inexpensive rather than after manufacturing completion
• The 1990s Boeing 777 program exemplified successful "Boeing plus FAA versus the problem" collaboration that delivered certification in under one year
• FAA officials visit Boom facilities regularly to observe progress and provide feedback while designs remain flexible rather than locked into production tooling
• This transparent approach builds trust through demonstrated competence rather than requiring faith in undocumented internal processes
• By the time certification applications reach final review, both parties understand all design decisions and testing methodologies through shared development experience

The collaborative model treats regulators as partners in safety rather than obstacles to overcome, enabling faster approvals through better communication.

Technology Evolution: Why 2025 Enables What 1970 Couldn't

Advances in materials, engines, and computational design provide the technical foundation for economically viable supersonic travel that didn't exist during the Concorde era.

• Boeing 787 carbon fiber composite technology enables complex fuselage shaping impossible with aluminum construction, providing 20% aerodynamic efficiency improvement
• Variable fuselage geometry—larger in front, narrower in back—optimizes airflow characteristics while maintaining structural integrity through composite manufacturing
• Modern turbofan engines eliminate Concorde's inefficient military afterburner technology, providing cleaner, quieter operation with substantially better fuel economy
• Advanced superalloys enable turbine operation at temperatures above the metal melting point through internal cooling systems and directional solidification casting
• Computational fluid dynamics replaces expensive wind tunnel testing with overnight virtual simulations that evaluate hundreds of design variations simultaneously
• Cloud computing provides access to massive computational resources without requiring internal supercomputer infrastructure investments
• Software design tools enable small teams to accomplish work previously requiring large engineering departments through automation and optimization algorithms
• Engine architecture improvements combine with materials advances to deliver approximately 20% fuel efficiency gains compared to 1970s technology baseline

These technological improvements compound to enable aircraft that are simultaneously faster, quieter, more efficient, and more comfortable than historical supersonic designs.

The Capital Efficiency Revolution: Hardware Versus Software Myths

Boom's development approach challenges conventional wisdom about hardware company capital requirements while demonstrating how modern techniques can dramatically reduce development costs.

• Software companies like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb often consumed more venture capital than hardware companies like SpaceX, Tesla, and Anduril during development phases
• The XB-1 prototype cost under $200 million including aircraft construction and complete flight test program, demonstrating 6x capital efficiency versus NASA's equivalent X-59 project
• Small elite engineering teams provide 10x productivity advantages over average engineers, while software tools and vertical integration amplify individual contributions
• Pre-order agreements with airlines include prepayment schedules that provide development funding without dilutive equity financing
• Hardware companies can't follow software's build-test-iterate model but can prove market demand through customer commitments before major capital deployment
• The mysterious side project—described as Boom's equivalent to SpaceX's Starlink—could reduce total capital requirements by an order of magnitude through revenue diversification
• Target total development costs range from $1-3 billion compared to Boeing's $10+ billion for new aircraft programs, enabled by capital efficiency improvements
• Revenue acceleration through airline prepayments and side project monetization reduces external funding requirements while maintaining development timeline

This approach demonstrates how modern development methods can make ambitious hardware projects financially viable without massive government subsidies.

Supply Chain Politics: How Congress Kills Efficiency

The geographic distribution of aerospace manufacturing reflects political rather than economic optimization, creating systemic inefficiencies that new entrants can avoid.

• Defense procurement requirements spread production across congressional districts to ensure political support for military programs through job distribution
• Single parts traverse multiple states during production: South Carolina to North Carolina to Wisconsin and back, with components spending more time shipping than in active manufacturing
• Cost-plus contracting structures incentivize expense maximization rather than efficiency optimization, as profits increase with higher costs
• Established aerospace companies cannot escape this system while depending on defense contracts, but commercial-focused companies can optimize for efficiency
• SpaceX succeeded by pivoting away from traditional defense procurement toward NASA commercial programs with different contracting structures
• Boom's commercial airline focus enables politically independent supply chain decisions based on manufacturing efficiency rather than congressional geography
• The factory in Greensboro, North Carolina consolidates production under one roof rather than distributing across multiple facilities for political reasons
• Building permits for the 200,000 square foot facility took 18 months—longer than actual construction—due to regulatory requirements including noise studies for unbuilt aircraft

This political optimization creates opportunities for new entrants who can avoid legacy constraints while building more efficient operations.

The Passenger Experience Equation: Speed Versus Comfort Trade-offs

Market research and airline economics suggest passengers will choose faster flights over longer luxury experiences when pricing and scheduling align with business travel needs.

• Trans-Atlantic supersonic flights lasting 3-4 hours compare to domestic first-class experiences rather than overnight international flights requiring flatbed seats
• Airlines don't install flatbeds on 3-5 hour domestic routes, suggesting supersonic trans-oceanic flights won't require full bedroom accommodations
• Daytime scheduling enables morning departures with afternoon European arrivals, allowing passengers to sleep in actual beds rather than aircraft seats
• Passenger surveys indicate 87% of international business travelers would switch airlines for supersonic access despite losing frequent flyer benefits
• Productivity advantages matter more to business travelers than luxury amenities when flight duration matches typical domestic business travel times
• The aircraft interior design remains confidential but promises domestic first-class quality with space, connectivity, and comfort innovations
• Competitive dynamics force airlines to match supersonic offerings once competitors gain advantages, creating arms race toward faster service
• Revenue advantages for airlines through speed dividend economics make supersonic profitable even with premium aircraft acquisition costs

The value proposition centers on time savings for business productivity rather than luxury travel experiences that drive leisure market choices.

Manufacturing Renaissance: Building America's Aerospace Future

Boom's experience illustrates broader challenges and opportunities in rebuilding American advanced manufacturing capabilities across multiple industries.

• Regulatory complexity extends beyond aviation to general manufacturing, where building permits often take longer than actual construction
• Environmental impact studies for theoretical future aircraft noise delayed factory construction, demonstrating regulatory disconnection from practical development needs
• Fire department approvals represent bottlenecks for engine test facility construction, showing how multiple agencies can slow industrial development
• The talent distillery model combines 80% young engineers who "don't know what's impossible" with 20% experienced "oak" providing institutional knowledge
• Senior aerospace hires from legacy companies uniformly failed in startup environments due to ingrained assumptions about development processes and cost structures
• Successful aerospace entrepreneurs require willingness to question fundamental assumptions and develop new approaches rather than replicating existing methods
• China's regulatory approach enables faster development but potentially compromises safety, while American over-regulation slows innovation without necessarily improving outcomes
• Risk assessment monopolies by government entities create asymmetric incentives toward excessive caution rather than balanced safety-versus-progress evaluations

The manufacturing renaissance requires both technological innovation and regulatory reform to enable efficient development of advanced products in competitive global markets.

Blake Scholl's vision for supersonic travel represents more than aircraft development—it embodies a broader philosophy about how American manufacturing can compete globally through innovation, efficiency, and customer focus rather than political optimization and regulatory accommodation. Whether Boom succeeds will test not just supersonic technology but the viability of entrepreneurial approaches to complex hardware development in highly regulated industries.